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1. Introduction 
Why do individuals commit crimes? What are the determinants of 
criminality? In what ways do economic, social or cultural conditions bear on 
crime levels? How do illegal markets function? These are some of the 
questions which, at least since the 1960s, scholars have attempted to reply to 
by using methods and instruments typical of economic studies (Becker, 
1968; Ehrlich, 1973; Stigler, 1970). Theoretical analyses have been flanked 
by a wide range of empirical literature aimed at examining the socio-
economic determinants of crime: a great deal of research has been aimed, for 
example, at analysing the relationship between unemployment and crime or 
regarding the influence of social and cultural variables on crime rates  
(Gordon, 1971; Freeman,1994; 2000; Levitt, 2001). At the same time as the 
micro-economic analysis of crime, a wide branch of research directed more 
specifically at analysing the structure and the behaviour of organized crime 
and the way the illegal markets work has been developed (Schelling,1980; 
Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1995). 
In the United States, the economic analysis of organized crime has 
analysed the organisation and functioning of the illegal markets in depth, in 
particular the drugs market, and the efficiency of deterrent  policies. The 
contributions since the 1980s from Peter Reuter (1983; 1985), for example, 
have been fundamental. To this author we owe some definitions of organized 
crime that are widely used in the literature on this theme and which, because 
of their generality, have often been used to delineate diverse criminal 
phenomena, including those of the mafia type1. 
If the subjects cited have been widely analysed in economic 
literature, comparatively less attention has been paid, however, to examining 
the socio-economic effects of crime. What effects does crime have on 
productivity, on investments and on the localisation of firms? What costs 
does crime impose on society and on the economy? In Italy’s case, more so 
than in other countries, such questions are particularly relevant and full of 
implications. The historical presence of mafia organisations in the regions of 
Southern Italy is, in fact, considered a strong blocking factor to regional 
development. Although the affirmation that the criminal presence negatively 
influences economic performance finds a wide, almost unanimous consensus 
in public opinion, quantitative research on the Italian case is relatively 
limited. Almost paradoxically, such questions are more frequently 
encountered in sociological studies than in strictly economic studies. 
By reviewing some of the principal empirical studies, this paper 
proposes to examine the impact of the criminal organisations on regional 
                                                 
1 A vast collection of definitions on organized crime has been collected by Klaus von Lampe 
and is available, together with a rich bibliography on the subject, on the www.organized-
crime.de website (see, furthermore, Lampe 2008, 2006). 
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economic development, with particular reference to the case of Italy. The 
paper is structured as follows: section 2 contains a review of the literature on 
the relationship between crime and economic development; section 3 
examines the regional distribution and the social costs of some crimes (in 
particular extortion) that can be linked to mafia type criminality; finally, 
some observations close the paper. 
2.  Crime and economic development 
Crime imposes significant costs on society. The costs are varied: 
there are those sustained by the victims, those relative to the expense of 
protection and prevention or those for the police and the judicial apparatus. 
Such costs fall directly on both private individuals and on the community. 
Estimating these costs is a complex, but useful operation, both for actuating 
alternative suppressive strategies as well as for evaluating the efficiency of 
the measures applied (Brand e Price, 2000). 
In a wider sense, crime imposes costs that, diversely to those 
precedent, are not represented by direct monetary payment but consist, 
rather, of “notional costs” that society as a whole sustains in the form of lost 
opportunities for development, a reduction in the rates of growth or lost 
investment. Such costs can be compared to “negative externality” that bear 
on everyone, not only those directly interested by criminal phenomena.  
In the case of the mafia, “external costs” derive, for example, from 
the infiltration of the mafia into the Institutions, from the appropriation of 
part of public expenditure, from the distortion of markets or from the 
creation of a local socio-institutional climate that is unfavourable to 
investment by legitimate firms. These costs can be translated, for example, 
into lower productivity, loss of investments, the flight of companies or, more 
in general, in a lower than potential rate of productivity growth. In brief 
therefore, the total costs that crime impose include those sustained directly 
by private citizens (private costs), the payments for the collective measures 
of prevention and suppression (public costs) and the “external”, notional or 
“social”  costs. 
Estimates of the social costs of crime have been elaborated for some 
countries: the United Kingdom, for example (Brand and Price, 2000), or for 
those of Central America (United Nations, 2007). At an international level, 
an analysis of the effects of crime on economic development is offered by 
Van Dijck (2007), who builds a composite index of organized crime for 150 
countries. The analysis underlines how crime tends to depress economic 
growth through the presence of corruption and a weakening of the 
Institutional systems, in particular those necessary for long-term economic 
growth. In Italy’s case (where the presence of mafia organisations has 
undoubtedly caused significant costs for the community), surprisingly, the 
analyses aimed at estimating the costs of crime are very few in number. The 
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aim of this work is to offer a sampling of  such studies, together with some 
data relative to the incidence of crime in the Italian regions. 
2.1. Crime and economic development 
If the costs of crime can be notable, what is the relationship between 
crime and economic development? Is the presence of organized crime a 
cause of economic under-development or does it represent, rather, one of the 
effects? The argument that crime negatively influences regional economic 
performance can be found in many works, both economic and sociological; 
this argument (intuitive, generally) is almost always expressed, however, by 
description and is rarely based on quantitative bases. To have some idea of 
the relationship between crime and development it is possible to consider 
some simple correlations. Fig. 1 illustrates the correlation between the 
number of crimes of criminal association, including those of the mafia type, 
and the per capita GDP in 103 Italian provinces, while Fig.2 considers 
homicides, instead. 
 
Fig. 1. Correlation between criminal association (per 10,000 inhabitants) and per capita 
GDP in the Italian provinces 
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Data refers to 2000-2005 averages. Source: Elaborated from ISTAT data, “Territorial 
information system on justice”. 
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Fig. 2. Correlation between homicide (per 10,000 inhabitants) and per capita GDP in the 
Italian provinces. 
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Data refers to 2000-2005 averages. Source: Elaborated from ISTAT data, “Territorial 
information system on justice”. 
 
As is evident, the correlation between the variables is negative, 
although not particularly high (R2 0,25). It should be noted, however, that 
correlation results as positive if one considers the total numbers of provincial 
crimes, instead of homicides or criminal association, measured against the 
number of crimes committed per 10,000 inhabitants. The negative 
relationship, therefore, is encountered only for certain types of crime – 
criminal association, homicide, but also, as we shall see later, extortion – 
which can be reasonably linked to the presence of organized crime. It must 
be underlined, however, that the existence of a correlation does not, in itself, 
demonstrate anything other than a simple statistical link between two 
variables, saying nothing about a possible cause2. The examination of the 
empirical relationship between crime and development needs, therefore, 
more rigorous analysis. 
From the macroeconomic point of view, a formalisation of the 
impact of crime on local income is provided in some essays by Centorrino 
and Signorino (1993; 1997). In the first of these works, the authors offer a 
simple model of Keynesian derivation in which, commencing from an 
equation of aggregate demand, a “multiplier of the criminal expenditure” is 
                                                 
2 In principle, thus, another variable, not considered in the analysis, cannot be excluded, that 
is that both influences therefore generate a spurious correlation. 
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obtained3. A brief exposition then follows. The initial hypotheses can 
therefore be presented thus: 
 the illegal sector coincides with the market (traffic) of drug; 
 resident producers of illegal goods and services do not exist, 
therefore such products are the work of residents abroad; 
 The demand for consumer goods is distinguished between a 
legal component and another for illegal goods and services. 
Formally, the function of aggregate consumption is: 
bYaCCC IL +=+=     (1) 
where consumption C is distinguished as consumption of legal or 
illegal goods, a is the autonomous consumption and b the marginal 
propensity to consume. The equation of the aggregate demand in the closed 
economy can be written, as per usual, as: 
ICGIbYaY −+++=    (2) 
in (2), I is  investment, G public spending and IC  illegal 
consumption, which constitutes a subtraction from the circular flow of 
income both because, as hypothesised, the illegal goods and services are 
produced by non-residents (they are therefore imported), and because, since 
they are illegal, are not counted as part of national income.  From (2) we can 
easily derive an equation of the level of equilibrium of income and, 
consequently, estimate the impact that, through the multiplier 1/(1-b, an 
increase in consumption of illegal goods generates on income. Such an effect 
is clearly depressive, in that illegal consumption, considered as imports, 
remove income from other categories. 
The extension proposed by Centorrino and Signorino (1993), 
consists of the hypothesis that income deriving from the illegal sector is 
ascribable to people resident within the economy and that such income 
represents a fraction of the consumption of illegal goods: 
II CY γ=  with  10 << γ    (3) 
where IY  is the income ascribed to the illegal sector and γ indicates 
the share of consumption. The function of consumption of the illegal sector 
can therefore be written in the following manner: 
III CYC βγαβα +=+=    (4) 
                                                 
3 The authors declare that they have taken the plan of the model analysis from Peter Reuter’s 
analyses (1984), that refer to the case of the United States and the narcotics market. 
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and, by substituting this in (2) the following multiplier of spending is 
obtained: 
b
M −
−=
1
1 βγ
 
where the total impact on aggregate income depends on the value of 
spending of the illegal income preceptors within the economy, and their 
propensity to consume. The limits of this model consist, other than the 
difficulties of estimating the parameters, of the fact that the illegal sector is 
made to coincide with the drug market, from which the model results as 
hardly empirically applicable in the case of Italy.  
A more advanced conceptual scheme, with notable empirical 
implications, on the relationship between crime and development is offered 
in some essays in Centorrino and Signorino’s work (1997) in which, among 
other things, the impact of the “ mafia tax” on the economy’s financial and 
credit systems is analysed, and estimates on money-laundering are proposed. 
With particular reference to the macro-economic effects, it is 
hypothesised: a) that the mafia is an agent that effects a forced withdrawal 
from income in the economy, analogous to taxes; b) that the incomes 
received by the criminal sector have a depressive effect on the local 
economy. Considering that the “mafia tax” (e.g. extortion), added to legal 
taxation, leads the economic operators to elude or avoid paying taxes, then 
the depressive effect becomes even greater. In other words, the “mafia tax” 
leads to a reduction in individual income and, bringing about forms of 
evasion or elusion, a reduction in fiscal revenue. Schematically, 
hypothesising that a subject is taxed twice, we may reassume the above in 
the following expression: 
( )[ ]{ } iMi RtetRd +−−= 1   
where for an individual i, the disposable income dR is given by the 
total income R , less taxes t and the mafia tax Mt ; indicating with e the share 
of legal taxes evaded because of the parallel mafia imposition, the term t – e 
represents the share of  lost fiscal revenue. 
Given that, by definition, the total revenue of a tax on income is 
given by the sum of the taxes paid by each individual:  
∑
=
==
n
i
i tYtRG
1
 
where Y is the aggregate income, it follows that the “mafia tax” 
reduces the total fiscal income: 
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This last expression shows that a fiscal gap, due to lack of revenue, 
and generated by organized crime, exists. To this we add that the existence 
of organized crime reduces legal income, because of the depressive effects 
that it produces on the local economy. Based on such observations, 
Centorrino and Signorino (1997) then proceed to estimate an equation of the 
impact of criminality on total fiscal revenue, including in the estimate the 
effect deriving from income not produced in the economy because of the 
mafia’s presence. According to the authors, who assume as the basis of their 
calculations the estimates on the economic turnover of crime available at the 
time, the loss of revenue due to income not produced in the economy would 
have been, in the year in question, equal to = 0.7% of GDP. To this should 
be added the lost fiscal revenue due to evasion induced by the same mafia 
presence. 
The effect of crime on long-term economic growth has been 
analysed in a recent work by Peri (2004), in which the roles of several 
variables are examined, among which are a proxy of “social capital”  and the 
level of crime (measured in numbers of homicides), on Italian economic 
growth. The study, which considers data from 95 Italian provinces, refers to 
the period 1951-1991. The aim of the work is to discover whether the lack of 
“social capital” is really, as some studies have hypothesised, sociological in 
character, as in Edward Banfield (1958) and Robert Putnam’s (1993) highly 
influential works, and one of the reasons for the backwardness of the 
Mezzogiorno, or, that other factors, such as organized crime, have weighed 
more heavily instead. 
The results of the econometric estimates carried out by Peri offer 
little empirical support for the sociological theses mentioned, demonstrating, 
instead, how crime has had a notable influence on regional development. In 
particular it can be seen how the correlations between the social capital 
index, employment rates and industrial growth are weak, while they become 
highly significant when one considers the crime rate. According to the study, 
some provinces on Sicily and in Calabria have seen a growth in employment 
lower than 1.2% circa, per year, for forty years, because of the high crime 
rate.  
Into the strain of empirical research on the determinants of crime in 
Italy the contribution of Buonanno and Montolio (2006) fits, in which the 
role of social capital on crime rate is examined. Social capital is measured by 
various indicators: associations, voluntary work, voters in referendums and 
blood donors per 100,000 inhabitants; the crime rate is calculated on the 
basis of data for theft, robbery and auto-theft. The results obtained in the 
regressions demonstrate how the level of civic-mindedness and association 
(social capital) tend to associate with lower rates of crimes against property. 
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Although it presents notable points of interest, this work considers some 
crimes which (as their geographical distribution shows) are not typically 
mafia type crimes, and therefore hardly indicative of the relationship that 
exists in the regions of the Mezzogiorno hardest hit by the mafia 
phenomenon, between the immaterial factors of development, among which 
social capital and crime figure.  
Moving on to the quantifications of the impact of crime on 
development and employment, the small quantity of research extant in Italy 
are often lacking from the methodological point of view, or are based on 
barely reliable data. One attempt to estimate, for example, was carried out in 
2002 by the CNC Foundation and Censis (2003) in  research with the theme 
“companies and confidence in the Mezzogiorno” as its object.  
The survey, carried out through questionnaires distributed among a 
wide selection of southern companies, was aimed at learning the 
businessmen’s perceptions about security conditions and the frequency of 
certain crimes. The questionnaire contained, in particular, a question aimed 
at quantifying the damage caused to the company by the presence of crime. 
On the basis of the replies obtained, through an inferential method, the 
surveyors proceeded to quantify the total costs of crime on the production 
system in the South, both in terms of lost production and in terms of lost jobs 
(for a description see Alleva and Arezzo, 2004). The elaborations carried out 
on these questionnaires led to the following estimates: a loss of wealth equal 
to approx. 7.5 billion Euros in 2001; a loss of jobs equal to 180, 561 job 
places, equal to 5.6% of the occupied job places in the companies the areas 
that participated in the survey. For an idea of such costs, one should consider 
that the lost production corresponded to 2.7% of the GDP of Southern Italy 
and to 0.6% of national GDP in 2001, while the unoccupied job places as a 
result of crime represented 2.8% of those in the South and 0.8% of national 
places in the same year. If the conclusions reached by the survey in question 
have been widely noted, its basic methodology has been frequently 
criticised, in particular the fact that the estimates have been deduced from 
sources representing subjective perceptions, and therefore potentially subject 
to great distortion (for example, La Spina, 2008). Successive research aimed 
at quantifying the levels and social cost of some crimes show, in fact, 
different results to those obtained by the Censis survey. We shall examine 
some of this research in the following sections. 
2.2. The effects on productivity 
The impact of organized crime on productivity at work has been 
amply investigated in literature, from the empirical profile, particularly. In 
this section we will offer a synthetic summary of some of the main works. In 
one of the first studies on the theme, Busetta and Sacco (1992), examined the 
relationship between productivity in the manufacturing sector, an index of 
the quality of the economic environment  and an index of infrastructural 
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endowment. The quality of the economic environment is measured through 
the levels of unpaid credit and bank write-offs, the levels of unemployment 
and the number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. The work shows how 
the correlation between the quality of the environment and labour 
productivity in the manufacturing sector is both negative and statistically 
significant. 
A rigorous econometric analysis was used by Felli and Tria (2000) 
in their work, which proposes two objectives: a) to examine in what way 
criminal behaviour is sensitive to public spending (transfers) and to the 
business cycle; b) estimate the effects of organized crime (mafia) on 
productivity in the private sector. The principal hypotheses are that, in the 
presence of public transfers, criminal activity (aimed, among other things, at 
obtaining ever greater shares of public spending), tends to increase, and that 
the negative effect of crime on the level of growth depends mainly on the 
low levels of productivity which, according to the authors, are “caused by 
the breaking down of the markets mechanisms and of the barriers that block 
new, competitive companies and the flow of foreign investment from 
entering” (Felli and Tria, 2000, p. 86).  
To verify this hypothesis, the authors used a data panel, relative to 
the 20 regions for the period 1960-96, and different methods of estimation 
(SUR and GLS). The results obtained show how the crime rate 
(approximated by the rate of voluntary homicide) increases with the growth 
of public transfers (“external income”) and is sensitive to the national 
business cycle. Furthermore, it is shown how productivity at work is 
depressed both by the crime rate and by the extent of non-market economic 
activities. 
Successive analyses have been carried out by Ofria (1999) and 
Centorrino and Ofria (2001). In this last work, the relationship between 
productivity and a series of variables related to the socio-economic 
environment  (among which the presence of crime) in the Italian regions for 
the years 1998-99 are  analysed. The authors observe how the variables in 
context condition the performances of the companies in all sectors; in 
agriculture and construction in particular, the influence appears greater with 
respect those appertaining to the industrial sector in a strict sense. 
Aside from the cited studies, Centorrino and Ofria have recently 
(2008) analysed the relationship between productivity and crime in the 
theoretical context proposed by Kaldor, which reformulates “Verdoorn’s 
law” on productivity growth. In the work cited, the authors estimate some 
regressions in which productivity growth is explained by the growth in 
production, by the relationship between investment and GDP, and by a proxy 
of the crime phenomenon given by the ratio between mafia homicides and 
population.  
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The data utilised refer to the period 1983-2005 and consider four 
economic sectors. The equations estimated are the following:  
cCRybap ++= ••   
p a b y c I GDP dCR
• •= + + +  
fCRey +=•  
where 
•
p is the rate of growth of labour productivity, 
•
y  that of 
production, /I GDP the relationship between investment and GDP and CR 
the proxy for organized crime. The results obtained for the four southern 
regions most interested by the mafia phenomenon are summarised in Table 
1. 
 
Table 1. Significance of the crime proxy on the growth of productivity (with a negative coefficient) 
Regions Agriculture Services  Construction Industry 
Calabria *** * * * 
Campania ** * *** *** 
Puglia ** * *** * 
Sicilia * * *** ** 
Note: The services sector includes retail/wholesale, repairs, hotels and restaurants, transport and 
communications. The coefficients for the crime proxy are negative. For significance: * indicates1<t<2,  
** 2,1<t<2,5, *** t>2,6. Source: Centorrino and Ofria (2008, p. 174).  
 
In general, the work shows the presence of crime of the mafia type 
negatively influences the rate of growth of productivity in the southern 
regions, in construction and non-tradable production particularly. In 
synthesis,  the results obtained in the empirical research offer ample proof to 
sustain the thesis according to which the presence of organized crime 
influences labour productivity, contributing, in this way, to explaining the 
regional development disparities. 
2.3. The effects on external investments 
The hypothesis that the presence of organized crime influences the 
capabilities of the regions of the Mezzogiorno to attract  investment from 
outside the area, particularly from abroad, is widely upheld by scholars. 
Sylos Labini (1985), for example, has underlined how criminal organisations 
impose “cuts”, forcing activities to move elsewhere, discouraging those 
businessmen interested in investing in the South. This problem has also been 
underlined very clearly by the economist Mancur Olson (1984), according to 
whom Southern Italy has accumulated, over a period of time, a vast range of 
extra-governmental institutions that have corroded the economy, increasing 
the risks for investment. For this reason — Olson argues — whoever intends 
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to start a new business in that kind of environment, will need to confront a 
series of risks that he could easily avoid if he were to start the business in a 
less “risky” environment.  
In other words, the presence of organized crime determines a socio-
institutional environment (or business climate) in the Mezzogiorno that is 
unfavourable for business activities in that it is characterised by greater risks 
with respect to those encountered in regions with a lower incidence of crime. 
As the sociologist La Spina (2008, p. 18) notes: “Those with a business in 
the South already have a difficult time and, above all, those who could open 
a business in the South give up the idea, going elsewhere”. 
The above-cited observations are born out by some surveys, aimed at 
examining the perceptions of businessmen from the Centre-North and some 
foreign countries of the southern regions. Research carried out by Marini and 
Turato (2002), for example, on a panel of businessmen from the North-East 
of Italy interested in the process of internationalisation, has shown how 
almost all those interviewed (92.6%) considered the presence of crime as the 
main block for investments in the Mezzogiorno. Another survey, carried out 
on behalf of the Ministries of the Economy in 11 countries, confirms that 
businessmen perceive the Mezzogiorno as appearing an area lacking 
conditions of security (Gpf-Ispo, 2005). 
In other terms, crime reflects negatively on the image of the 
Mezzogiorno, limiting the attractiveness of the area, even though the crime 
levels in the various regions, and even more so among the provinces, varies 
notably. Beyond such surveys, it is an intuitive fact that the presence of 
crime constitutes a block to potential investors, confirmed both in the 
declarations of politicians and by the investigations effected by magistrates. 
Recently some studies, such as those of Basile (2001), Pazienza et 
al. (2005), Daniele (2007) and Daniele and Marani (2008), using data on 
certain crimes, have shown how crime negatively influences foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Italian regions. Part of the analysis from Daniele and 
Marani’s study (2008), directly aimed at estimating the effects of the 
presence of crime on FDI, follows. 
In order to estimate the impact of organized crime on FDI, the 
authors used a dataset comprising observations for 103 provinces for the 
period 2000-2006. The empirical analysis was based on the following basic 
specification:  
 
i 1 i 2 i iFDI α β β εCrime= + + +Χ   [1] 
  
in which the dependant variable is the logarithm of FDI inflows in 
the provinces, iX is a set of control variables, while Crime is a measure of 
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the incidence of crime. The control variables are lagged by a period. The 
level of crime (per 10,000 inhabitants) is measured by an index composed of 
four crimes (extortion, arson, attacks and criminal association) typically 
connected to mafia type crime. The equation is estimated both through the 
pooled OLS method, and by a LAD (least absolute deviation) estimator. The 
results of the LAD estimates are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Effects of crime on FDI inflows in 103 Italian provinces  
Dependent variable: ln FDI inflows 
const -44.53** -55.06** -53.12** -59.14** -55.40** 
 (-3.58) (-4.23) (-4.23) (-4.848) (-4.325) 
Pop 1.295** 1.415** 1.303** 1.359** 1.533** 
 (4.339) (4.601) (4.223) (4.308) (5.374) 
GDPpc 3.747** 4.689** 4.624** 5.155** 4.600** 
 (3.18) (3.83) (4.00) (4.59) (3.85) 
Size of the 
economy (1) 
0.2755 0.264 0.294 0.299 0.232 
 (1.35) (1.40) (1.44) (1.45) (1.25) 
Size of the 
economy (2) 
0.008 0.004 0.003 0.0003 -0.0005 
 (0.97) (0.50) (0.39) (0.04) (-0.07) 
Industry 0.009** 0.0055 0.0073* 0.0068* 0.0053 
 (2.62) (1.46) (1.95) (1.83) (1.41) 
Infrastructure 0.0025 0.0017 -4.862e-05 -0.0020 0.0028 
 (0.69) (0.46) (-0.01) (-0.53) (0.81) 
Incentives 0.0276 0.0617 0.0531 0.0838 0.0437 
 (0.24) (0.58) (0.50) (0.78) (0.417) 
Extortion -0.2945**     
 (-2.19)     
Association  -0.6712**    
  (-2.12)    
Arson   -0.0494   
   (-1.33)   
Attacks    -0.0659  
    (-0.78)  
Crime Index     -0.2873** 
     (-2.5) 
n 103 103 103 103 103 
lnL -173.6 -173.3 -173.9 -173.9 -172.6 
Method: LAD estimations. t statistic in brackets - * denotes significance at the 10 % level ** denotes 
significance at the 5 % level. Source: Daniele and Marani (2008), to be consulted for a description of the 
data and methodology.  
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The results of the estimates show how the level of organized crime is 
both strongly and negatively correlated to FDI inflows in the Italian 
provinces. This supports the thesis according to which the presence of mafia 
type gangs discourages potential investors.  
The negative effect on FDI clearly constitutes a notable cost 
imposed by crime on the southern regions. FDI can, in fact, be a significant 
factor for regional growth, and for which reason incentives to attract 
potential investors exist in many countries (including Italy). Daniele and 
Marani’s study (2008), also considers a proxy of incentives to business 
among the variables (the variable Incentives in Table 2), that does not result 
as being correlated to FDI inflows in the provinces. 
The results of the work suggest that, in the presence of an 
unfavourable socio-institutional environment, the politics for attracting 
investment are scarcely efficient. Improving conditions of security and 
legality appears, also in this case, as a fundamental pre-requisite for 
economic development in the Mezzogiorno. 
2.4. Crime and unemployment 
In this section we shall examine the connection between 
unemployment and crime. Studies on this subject hypothesise that this 
connection ranges from the condition of the labour market to crime: higher 
unemployment rates tend to determine an higher incidence of some crimes. 
One tends, however, to exclude the possibility that the existence of crime 
can reduce job opportunities in the local labour markets, creating 
unemployment. With reference to the case of Italy, only in Peri’s study 
(2004), previously examined, is an influence (negative) of crime on 
employment hypothesised. Although unemployment is not, therefore, 
generally considered an effect (a “cost”) of crime (rather, one of its 
determinants), we include this argument in this section for the particular 
relevance it assumes in empirical research. 
The hypothesis according to which the condition of unemployment 
increases the probability that an individual will commit a crime has a solid 
theoretical basis. In the neo-classical approach, the choice of an individual 
between legal and illegal activities depends, in fact, on the expected returns: 
in the case in which the time and resources invested in an illegal activity 
have a greater return than those obtainable from alternative, legal work, the 
individual will have an incentive to become a criminal. Although it is purely 
abstract, this hypothesis finds fertile ground if considered in a concrete 
context where involuntary unemployment exists. Given that unemployment 
reduces the “opportunity costs” of delinquent activity, represented by the 
obtainable pay from legal activities and the losses deriving from an eventual 
jail sentence, it tends to increase the probability that an individual will 
choose delinquency. In this model, according to pure cost-benefit 
 15 
calculation, an unemployed individual receives greater net income from 
committing a crime than someone with a relatively high legal salary. 
The idea that unemployment is in some way positively  correlated to 
crime finds wide consensus in public opinion; however, empirical research 
often finds discordant results, which confirm how the choice of crime is 
influenced by a series of variables and not only by the expected income that 
it may generate. The international literature on this theme is vast, therefore 
we shall examine only a few of the most recent studies. First of all we shall 
examine some of the results obtained from research relative to the United 
States, in which the link  between unemployment and crime has been widely 
analysed.  
Among the most important works are those of Freeman (1994; 2000) 
who has examined in depth the relationship between the job market and 
crime. In one of his most recent studies Freeman (2000) observes how, in the 
United States, the number of detainees belonging to the workforce is very 
high, particularly if referring to black people. In 1993 (the year considered 
by the author), the number of detainees was, in fact, 1.9% of the male 
workforce; among black people the percentage rose to 8.8%. Furthermore, in 
the United States, the number of detainees grew notably over the years 
without, however, seeing a significant reduction in the number of crimes. 
According to Freeman, the rise in crime rates is, therefore, barely influenced 
by the increase in the number of incarcerations, while it is notably subject to 
the lack of job opportunities and the growth of individual imbalances in 
incomes, other than the reduction in real salaries received by people who are 
less educated, among whom there are, in large numbers, black people. In 
synthesis, the crime levels in the United States are significantly influenced 
by economic variables linked to the segmentations of the labour market and 
the income inequality.  
A deeper discussion of the methodological aspects relative to the 
empirical studies on unemployment and crime is presented by Levitt (2001). 
Using panel data for the United States (annual data for the 50 States for the 
period 1950-1990), the author estimates the following equation: 
1 2 1st st st st s t stCrime Unemp Unempβ β θ γ ε−= + + + + +X  
in which s corresponds to states and t indexes years. The variable 
Crime is measured in different specifications for violent crimes and those 
against property; Unemp is the state insured unemployment rate, also 
included as a lagged variable; X is a set of control variables that include, 
other than per capita income, some socio-economic indicators, including 
those relative to the demographic and ethnic composition. The estimates 
comprise fixed effects and annual dummies give the following results: an 
increase of 1% in the levels of unemployment is associated with an increase 
of between 1.4% and 2.7% in crimes against property, while no correlation 
between unemployment and violent crime is found. 
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 The case of the United States is also examined in the work of Lin 
(2008), who compares the results obtainable from the regressions when 
different econometric methods are used. The data used by this author refer to 
the years 1974-2000, while the analysis is conducted by the OLS method and 
with that of instrumental variables (IV). The results show how an increase of 
1% in the rate of unemployment is associated with an increase in crimes 
against property equal to 1.8% when the OLS method is used, while the 
elasticity rises considerably, reaching 4%, when the IV method is used. This 
second result explains 30% of the changes in crimes against property during 
the 1990s in the United States, and for which reason results as being more 
reliable than the first method, according to the author. 
Evidence for the United Kingdom, on the other hand, is presented by 
Carmichael and Ward (2001), who examine the effects of some variables 
relative to the efficiency of the judicial system and the socio-economic 
conditions on crime levels measured for different crimes (theft, breaking and 
entering, fraud and counterfeit goods). According to the authors, the crime 
rates are explained by the rate of unemployment more than by the other 
variables considered, such as the average length of incarceration, the average 
times for reaching a definitive sentence, the demographic density and the 
percentage of births outside matrimony. 
The correlation between unemployment and crime has been 
highlighted in the Swedish case by Nilsson and Agell (2003) through an 
econometric analysis based on data referring to 289 municipalities (therefore 
very disaggregated). According to the authors, the reduction in the levels of 
unemployment registered in Sweden in the 1990s determined a reduction in 
the numbers of burglary and automobile theft equal to 15% and 20% 
respectively. 
In Italy too is possible to see the existence of a correlation between 
unemployment levels and some crimes. If one considers data on a provincial 
level, for example, then unemployment is positively and highly correlated to 
extortions, homicides and attacks, while it is negatively correlated with 
thefts (table 3). Such correlations, it is useful to underline, do not implicate a 
causal connection among the variables. Rather, in the case under exam, it is 
possible that the correlation is due to the simple fact that both unemployment 
levels and the incidence of the crimes considered are greater in the 
Mezzogiorno compared to the rest of the country. Table 3 shows, moreover, 
how thefts are negatively correlated to the other crimes that are typical of 
organized crime: in other words, in the areas with a higher mafia presence 
fewer thefts are encountered, on average. 
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Table 3 Correlation between unemployment and some crimes in Italy. Data for 103 provinces, 
averages for the period 2000-2005. 
  Unemployment Extortion Homicide Attacks  Theft 
Unemployment 1,00 0,63 0,62 0,50 -0,32 
Extortion 0,63 1,00 0,42 0,34 -0,09 
Homicide 0,62 0,42 1,00 0,72 -0,15 
Attacks 0,50 0,34 0,72 1,00 -0,20 
Theft -0,32 -0,09 -0,15 -0,20 1,00 
The crimes are calculated per 10,000 inhabitants. In bold type, significant values (except 
diagonal) at alpha level = 0.050 (bilateral test). Source: Calculations from Istat data. 
 
 
The influence of unemployment levels on crime is not as easy to 
estimate as it might seem. Methodological questions can concern both the 
data to be considered (for example territorial disaggregation, types of crime 
to include in the regressions), and the eventual distortions deriving from 
omitted variables. The results of the empirical studies on the Italian case 
show, generally, the existence of a link between unemployment and crime; 
as may be imagined, such a link is verified, however, only for some crimes.  
Campiglio (1990), for example, through provincial data relative to 
the 1981 census, finds a significant link between unemployment and 
robberies. Cellini and Scorcu (1998), analyse the principal economic 
determinants of crime rates (relative to homicides, robberies and thefts) 
between 1951 and 1994; other than unemployment the authors include 
economic variables such as consumption and wealth among the variables. 
The results show the existence of a strong link between consumption and 
homicides and robberies, while the unemployment rate mainly influences 
thefts; one also notes a structural break between the 1960s and 70s, which 
would indicate, for the phase successive to the “economic boom”, a slowing 
down effect of economic activity on the crime levels. 
The relationship between unemployment and crime is later examined 
from the econometric point of view by Marselli and Vannini (2000). The 
study, referring to the years 1970-1994, considers the rates for the crimes of 
voluntary homicide, theft and robbery, extortion and kidnapping for ransom. 
The estimates (panel with fixed effects) lead the authors to affirm that “an 
increase of one percentage point in the rate of unemployment determines an 
increase of approximately 118 crimes of theft, 12 robberies and 0.2 
voluntary homicides per 100,000 inhabitants” (Marselli and Vannini, 2000, 
p. 296). 
The impact of unemployment on crime has recently been examined 
by Buonanno (2006b), who uses data for the twenty Italian regions for the 
period 1993-2002. Crime is measured by property crime rate, theft rate and 
total crime rate. Numerous regressors are considered: other than the total 
unemployment levels, male, young people and long-term, some variables 
relative to the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the 
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regions and a clear-up variable (to measure the efficiency of deterrence 
policies) are considered. 
For example, indicators relative to the presence of foreign 
populations are considered, to the resident populations in cities with more 
than 250,000 inhabitants, to the per capita GDP and to the levels of 
secondary and university education. The results of the analyses of regression 
(carried out by the GMM method) show how the crime rates are explained 
by the per capita GDP and by the levels of urbanisation, while the effect of 
unemployment results as almost nil. Significant differences are encountered 
between the North and the South of the country. In the southern regions, 
diversely from the others, the socio-economic variables, including 
unemployment, exercise a significant influence on the crime rates. 
In summary, although with some differences, the cited studies 
indicate the existence of a positive relationship between unemployment and 
crime, in particular for crimes against property. It must be observed, 
however, that in the various empirical works crime is measured by different 
crimes and that among these, those considered typical of organized crime are 
not considered. The relationship between crime and unemployment may, 
therefore, be influenced by omitted variables, that were not included among 
the regressors or, simply, by the fact that higher levels of crime are 
encountered in the regions of the South, where unemployment is higher and 
where the presence of organized crime has deeper roots.  
Table 4 offers a synthesis of the arguments expounded in the present 
paragraph. The economic variables, both real and financial, are shown, on 
which crime produces effects, together with some of the studies that consider 
such effects with reference to Italy. 
 
Table 4. Real and financial effects of organized crime: some studies 
Variables Effect Studies 
Multiplier of income - Centorrino e Signorino (1993) 
Savings - Centorrino e Signorino (1993);  
Productivity - Felli e Tria (2000);  Centorrino e Ofria (2001; 2008) 
Foreign investments - Basile (2001); Pazienza et al. (2005); Daniele (2007); 
Daniele and Marani (2008) 
Employment - Peri (2004) 
Tax evasion + Centorrino and Signorino (1997) 
Unofficial credit and loansharking + Masciandaro (2000; 2002) 
 
3. The spread of organized crime: extortion  
That extortion is a crime congenital to the very existence of a mafia 
type organisation has been known for some time. Other than the numerous 
judicial enquiries, it is documented by effectively all the scholars of the 
subject such as, for example, Franchetti (1875), Catanzaro (1991) and 
Gambetta (1992) with reference to Cosa Nostra, Ciconte (1992) to the 
‘ndrangheta or Monzini (1999) to the camorra. The collection of extortion 
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payments covers multiple purposes: on the one hand it ensures a regular flow 
of income to the mafia gangs; on the other it guarantees a capillary control of 
the territory that is made real by the exertion of an intimidatory power over 
the local businesses. In its most common form, typical of the mafia, the 
racket of extortion is a sort of tax imposed by the gangs for corresponding 
protection services. 
Normally the payment of extortion occurs with the periodic payment 
of sums of money; in some cases payment may be made in goods or 
services. Carried out for simple extortion or, more often, to exercise a 
monopolistic control of the local market, extortions can be classified in 
diverse types (Monzini, 1993):  
1) anonymous extortions: of the predatory type, where the requests, 
occasional and anonymous, are generally accompanied by threats; 
2) protection-extortions: aimed at creating a system of payments 
similar to taxation and typical of the mafia, tending to create a lengthy 
relationship between the extortionist and the extorted, and a kind of 
legitimisation of the mafia’s system of control of the territory where the 
local gang exercises a monopolistic power; 
3) Extortion of the workforce: known as labour racketeering, it is an 
intermediation that is exercised by controlling the local labour markets both 
from the standpoint of jobs sought and those offered. 
The capillary control of the territory, the fear of reprisals and the 
economic sustainability of the extortion payment requested, often makes the 
victims fail to report the crime. In the areas particularly hit by the racket of 
extortion a sort of “forced marriage” is consequently created, between the 
extortionist and his victim, which makes it difficult to individuate the crime. 
For this reason the statistics based on the crimes reported notably 
underestimate the real dimension of the phenomenon of extortion.  
According to Istat data, in the period 1000-2005 a little over 25,500 
extortions were reported in Italy, of which 52% were in the regions of the 
Mezzogiorno. Such data clearly included all crimes of extortion, not only 
those attributable to mafia type organized crime. Despite this, if one looks at 
the number of extortions per 10,000 inhabitants one can see how, in the 
Mezzogiorno, the incidence is greater than in the rest of the country (Fig.3) 
and how, in the regions harder hit by the mafia phenomenon, the incidence 
of extortions is higher with respect to the national average, with peaks in 
Calabria, Campania, Apulia and, in a slightly lower measure, on Sicily 
(Chart 1). 
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Fig.3 Extortion in Italy, per 10,000 inhabitants, cumulated 2000-05. 
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Source: Calculations from Istat data. 
 
 
Chart 1. Regional distribution of extortion, 2000-05. 
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Extortion per 10,000 inhabitants -  index Italy = 100. Source: Calculations from Istat data.  
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Chart 2. Regional distribution of arson attacks, 2000-05. 
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Arson per 10,000 inhabitants - index Italy = 100. Source: Calculations from Istat data. 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
In synthesis, if the data on reported events show the existence of 
significant regional differences, on the whole they notably underestimate the 
phenomenon. It is possible to hypothesise, however, that there are other 
crimes that are symptomatic indicators of the activity of extortion: damage, 
for example, suffered by commercial activities (La Spina and Lo Forte, 
2006). The intimidatory acts that are committed by criminals to induce 
businessmen reluctant to pay extortion may cause little damage to the 
companies, and are therefore not reported. In other cases, however, the 
intimidation may be far more serious and turn into attacks or arson. If the 
data relative to arson attacks in the Italian regions are calculated, one can 
observe how these are higher in number in the southern regions. In this case 
too, the regions hardest hit result as being Calabria, Apulia and Sicily, while 
the data for Campania is in line with the national average (Chart 2). 
In synthesis, the official data on some crimes – such as extortion – 
can be insufficient, although still useful, to illustrate the “geography of 
crime” of the mafia type. Other than in the data, the spread of the extortion 
carried out by the mafia is, often, also underestimated in the inquiries carried 
out by research institutes by posting questionnaires. This occurs for a variety 
of reasons, first among them being the low percentage of response from 
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those interviewed. A recent enquiry conducted by the National Chamber of 
Commerce (2007), for example, based on the data collected from the 
distribution of 60,000 questionnaires to companies in the different Italian 
regions, had a response rate of 6.3% (3,750 questionnaires). The rate of 
response also showed significant regional differences: it was, in fact, higher 
in the Centre-North than in the South, where the racket of extortion reaches 
its highest levels. For example, the percentage of response was 9.5% in 
Trentino, Veneto and Friuli, 9% in Lombardy and in Emilia-Romagna , 3.3% 
in Calabria and little more than 2% in Sicily and Campania. According to the 
results of the enquiry, 15% of the Sicilian respondents had declared 
receiving threats with the final objective of extortion, while the percentage 
was 12% in Calabria. Such results are, therefore, far lower than the data 
provided by other research or the results of judicial enquiries. 
According to an enquiry conducted by the Association Sos Impresa, 
of the Confederation of Commercial Activities (2007; 2008), there are 
between 160,000 and 180,000 business people in Italy who are caught up in 
the phenomenon of extortion, most of whom are in the southern regions. The 
‘racket of pizzo4’ involves 70% of Sicilian business people, 50% of those in 
Calabria, 40% of those in Campania and 30% of those in Apulia, for a total 
of over 120,000 business people involved in these four regions. Always 
according to the same Association, the phenomenon is particularly 
widespread in some areas and affects 80% of businesses in Catania and 
Palermo, 70% of businesses in Reggio di Calabria and 50% of those in 
Naples, the North Bari and Foggia areas. In total, extortion accounts for 
gains of 5.5 billion Euros. Although such estimates must be considered 
prudently because of the lack of a controllable methodology in the 
elaboration of the data, recent judicial enquiries show how the mafia 
imposition at Palermo and in other areas of Sicily is capillary, while in 
Calabria the racket of extortion strikes companies both small and large, like 
those involved in some public works, such as the construction of the 
Salerno-Reggio Calabria motorway5. 
The judicial enquiries show how the mafia exercises the activity of 
extortion by saturation collecting, which strikes all the commercial activities 
present in the territory controlled by the mafia family. The sums requested 
are highly variable: according to recent research conducted in Sicily, the 
sums range from a minimum of 32 Euros a month to a maximum of 
approximately 27,000 Euros, according to the size of the business; on 
average the sum paid is 881 Euros (Asmundo and Lisciandra, 2008). Table 5 
                                                 
4 In South Italy, pizzo is a slang term for extortion. 
5 According to a recent analysis carried out by Anas, the companies involved in the 
construction of the 5th  macro-section  of the Salerno-Reggio Calabria  motorway ( a macro 
section that runs from Gioia Tauro to Scilla, in the province of Reggio Calabria) suffered 100 
intimidatory attacks in 1,210 days, on average one attack every 12 days (R. Galullo, 
Sull’autostrada della malavita, Il Sole 24 Ore, 7th  February 2009, page 12).   
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shows some data on the entity of the pizzo paid in Naples and Palermo for 
some types of commercial and business activities. 
 
Table 5. Amount of extortion paid in Palermo and Naples (Euro) 
Economic activities Palermo Naples 
Market stall 1,00* 5-10* 
Shop 200-500 100-200 
Elegant shop or shop in city 
centre 
750-1.000 500-1.000 
Supermarket 5.000 3.000 
Construction site 10.000  
* Daily amounts. For others, monthly amounts. Source: Confesercenti (2008). 
 
 
Confirmation of the extent of the racket of pizzo comes from a study 
by the Fondazione Chinnici (La Spina, 2008), relative to the Sicilian case. 
The results of this study, made reliable by the methodology used in it, show 
how extortions strike 58% of the businesses in the region (maximum 
estimate), generating an annual cost to the productive system of 
approximately one billion Euros, corresponding to 1.3% of Sicily’s GDP in 
the year 2006. This is, as is evident, a very large figure, which indicates how 
the direct costs that crime imposes on the productive systems in the regions 
of the South are extremely high. 
4. Conclusive remarks 
The economic analysis of crime constitutes a very wide branch of 
research. Within it are found analyses of the micro-economics, aimed at 
investigating, also from the theoretical point of view, themes concerning the 
motivations that make individuals commit crimes, the methods of 
functioning of the illegal markets and the strategies of the criminal 
organisations. These are themes widely examined by a large quantity of 
literature, American above all, mostly aimed at examining the illegal 
substances market. The socio-economic determinants of crime have been 
examined in empirical research: there are, for example, numerous studies 
aimed at investigating what the effects of unemployment are, of the 
inequalities among incomes or the level of education on crime rates. 
The empirical aspects regarding the effects that crime produces on 
the economy of a society are, however, less widely examined. Estimates of 
the cost of crime have been carried out in some countries: these allow us to 
quantify the direct and indirect social costs of crime, such as those suffered 
by its victims and those born by the police and judicial machinery. Research 
aimed at analysing the ‘external’ social  costs of crime, such as those on 
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local economic development, on unemployment or investment are rare, 
however. This is evident in the case of Italy, where, excepting a few 
important exceptions, the economic analysis of crime, and in particular 
empirical analysis, constitutes a line of research that is still scant. 
To analyse and estimate the costs that crime imposes on the 
economy would be, in our opinion, very important. Other than being relevant 
from the standpoint of knowledge, analyses of this kind would make an 
important contribution to the research on the causes of the economic lagging 
behind in many areas, such as the Mezzogiorno of Italy for example, and to 
the definition of policy measures for their development. 
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